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The acquisition of a large class of ships is a
complex and costly undertaking. To bring the myriad
of elements which comprise the Integrated Logistics
Support (ILS) effort to bear on the process of
acquiring ships/systems in the most efficient manner
possible, requires an acquisition environment which
supports the intensive effort required to achieve ILS
objectives. This thesis examines the ILS efforts
associated with the U.S. Navy's acquisition of FFG-7
Class ships from conception through operational
deployment. Included are the design-to-cost and fly-
before-buy concepts and the change in ship's
operational tasking. Recommendations are provided for
improving program management, life-cycle logistics
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I. INTRODUCTION
A . BACKGROUND
System readiness is a primary objective of the
acquisition process. It is Department of
Defense (DOD) policy to ensure that resources to
achieve readiness receive the same emphasis a s
those required to achieve schedule and performan
ce objectives. These resources shall include those
necessary to design desirable support
characteristics into systems and equipment as well




In adhering to DOD policy, Secretary of the Navy
Instruction (SECNAVINST) 5000.1 requires that each
acquisition program charter include the designation of
a Logistics Manager to assist the Program Manager.
2
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) is to be considered
throughout the acquisition process in order to assure
cost consciousness and effective life-cycle support
for fleet systems. The DOD definition of ILS is:
A disciplined, unified, and iterative approach to
the management and technical activities necessary
to: (a) integrate support considerations into
system and equipment design; (b) develop support
requirements that are related consistently to
readiness objectives, to design, and to each other;
(c) acquire the required support; and (d) provide
1 U.S. Department of Defense Directive 5000.39,
Acquisition and Management of Integrated Logistic Support for
Systems and Equipment. 17 November 1983, p. 2.
^George S. Handler, George Hemmerle, and William Rucker,
"Navy Program Manager's Guide", January 1985, U.S. Naval
Material Command, Washington, D.C., p. 1-9.
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the required support during the operational phase
at minimum cost .
3
ILS pulls together concept, design, test and
evaluation, production, and operations into the
continuous development of systems to be used b y
today's Navy . * The entire ILS effort is a iterative
process throughout the life of a system. And DOD
guidance delineates specific ILS considerations for
Milestones 0, I, II, and III. 5 in particular, an ILSP
(Integrated Logistics Support Plan) must be developed
during the Concept Exploration Phase and be completed
by Milestone I of the acquisition process.
While logistic support has long been recognized
by the military as an essential element in
accomplishing military objectives, it was not until
the the early 1960 's that the ILS concept was
considered as a possible solution to logistic support
problems in DOD system acquisition efforts. The first
ILS instructions surfaced in DOD in 1964, and in the
Naval Material Command in 1966. However, it was not
until 1971 that the Navy became serious about ILS due
^U.S. Department of Defense Directive 5000.39,
Acquisition and Management of Integrated Logistic Support for
Systems and Equipment. 17 November 1983.
* Robert A. Bobulinski, "A Study of an Integrated
Logistic Support Application on a Surface Ship New
Construction Program" (Masters Thesis, U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1976), p. 9.
^Department of Defense Directive 5000.39, Acquisition
and Management of Integrated Logistic Support for Systems and
Equipment . 17 November 1983, Encl (3), pp. 1-5.
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to shrinking defense budgets and the potential cost
savings afforded by the application of the ILS concept
to the system acquisition process. Admiral Elmo
Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral
J.D. Arnold, then Chief of Naval Material, promulgated
instructions which assigned the responsibility for the
planning and acquisition of ILS to those individuals
acquiring particular end items. Those instructions
were a result of the Navy's concern that: a) logistic
planning information was being received too late or
not at all, b) supply support was poor, and c)




The objective of this thesis is to examine the
effectiveness of the Integrated Logistics Support
process, as it is applied to the Navy's shipbuilding
program, from an operator's point of view. More than
sixteen years after recognizing the importance of
considering life-cycle logistic support factors in
system design, the Navy's ships in the fleet continue
to be plagued with logistic support problems. While
the Navy seems to actively pursue ILS objectives early
in the acquisition of a system, it appears that basic
ILS principles are neglected as the system matures in
its life cycle.
9
The objective of this thesis is not to reach
definitive solutions to problems associated with ILS
execution, but rather, to provide background
information and a series of facts to stimulate
discussion and empirical analysis among those
individuals involved in ILS efforts. The author is
also concerned that, while they play a major role in
system life-cycles, end users/operators of acquired
systems are largely ignorant of the basic principles
of ILS and therefore, unknowingly, contribute to the
less than optimum achievement of ILS objectives.
C . SCOPE
The FFG-7 class ship acquisition program was
chosen as an example because it was the first such
major ship acquisition made by the U.S. Navy which was
to be procured utilizing ILS principles as set forth
by DOD . Also, the author was assigned duties as
Commissioning Engineer Officer on the 25th ship of the
class and gained first-hand knowledge of ILS from an
operator/end user perspective. It is hoped that the
author's experiences and facts taken from research
will provide an insight into the end user/operator's




Chapter II describes the ILS process as it
applies to the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding and
acquisition program. The purpose of the description
is to provide the reader with an understanding of the
importance of ILS in the U.S. Navy's ship acquisition
process
.
Chapter III presents both the author's and the
FFG-7 Program Management Office's views concerning the
application and effectiveness of ILS in the Navy's
FFG-7 Class ship acquisition program.
Chapter IV examines the effects of several U.S.
Navy acquisition concepts and ILS concerns on its
OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7) Class ship acquisition
program.
Chapter V presents a summary of the thesis, and
conclusions and recommendations concerning the ILS
process as it is applied to the Navy's acquisition of
entire ship classes.
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II. TT.fi IN SHIP /SYSTEM ACQUISITION
The acquisition of a new class of ships for the
U.S. Navy is an extremely detailed and complex process
involving a wide range of organizations and
disciplines which come together to formulate the
design, prepare detailed engineering plans, estimate
the cost, secure the budget, and finally manage the
building of the final product. Integrated Logistics
Support should be the glue by which the numerous
disciplines and organizations are bound together
throughout the acquisition process and the life cycle
of the ship/system being procured.
In the U.S. Navy, ship acquisition programs
consist of five phases. The phases are (1) Program
Initiation, (2) Concept Exploration, (3) Demonstration
and Validation, (4) Full Scale Development, and (5)
Production/Deployment
.
The starting point for the
acquisition process cannot be pinpointed. It emerges
gradually from the naval operational experience,
advances in the technology base, and intelligence
assessment of the threat - all integrated through
ongoing mission area analysis. Based on the threat,
the Department of the Navy (DON) evaluates a mission
need with respect to other needs, existing
capabilities, priorities, and resources. If the
12
evaluation results in the validation of the particular
mission need, DON then prepares a requirements
document describing the mission need and forwards it
to the Secretary of the Navy for consideration and
approval
.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the phases of
the acquisition process and their interrelationships
with the numerous elements of ILS
.
As this figure
shows, the elements of ILS should provide the boundary
within which the acquisition process takes place. The
principal elements of ILS include planning for
maintenance, manpower and personnel, training and
training support, supply support, transportation and
handling, and design interface requirements. ILS
plays an important role in each of the five
acquisition phases because it is a composite of all
considerations necessary to assure the effective and
economical support of a system for its life cycle.
During the Concept Exploration phase, ILS
requires that reliability, maintainability,
availability, and supportability (RMA&S) factors be
considered in the design of the ship/system. This
phase entails the solicitation and evaluation o f
alternative concepts designed to meet the requirements
of the mission need. Alternative concepts are
compared based on costs, schedule, readiness
13
objectives, and af fordability factors. Preliminary
Logistics Support Analyses (LSA ' s) provide the vehicle
by which the systems and their components are
evaluated.
Figure 1 ILS/ACQUIS ITION INTERFACE
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Over a system's life cycle, LSA's are used
iteratively to identify and evaluate the logistic
support necessary for a new system. As a design
analysis tool, LSA's include maintenance analysis,
level of repair analysis (LORA) , life-cycle costs (LCC)
analysis, and logistic support modeling. Costs
included in a LCC analysis include research and
development, production and construction, operation
and maintenance, and system retirement and phaseout
costs
.
The primary ILS products of the Concept
Exploration phase of the acquisition process are the
preliminary Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP)
which may include the Logistics Support Analysis
Plan(LSAP). The ILSP covers all logistics activities
throughout the system life-cycle while the LSAP
concentrates on specific program requirements as
related to system/logistics functions, LSA program
tasks, task input/output requirements, organization
approach and interface requirements, and data item
requirements
.
These plans form the basis for
reliability, maintainability, human factors, and
logistics considerations in the design process.
°
6 Benjamin S. Blanchard, Logistics Engineering and
Management . 3rd Edition, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall, Inc., 1986), pp. 429-433.
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The Demonstration and Validation phase involves
continued iterative design and demonstration of the
system or critical subsystems to verify performance,
ascertain the potential suitability of a concept to
fill the mission need, and to establish a credible
baseline LCC cost estimate. The ILSP, LSAP, and LSA's
are validated and/or updated based on the results o f
the selected test and evaluation criteria. The
selected criteria are usually threshhold values for
reliability, maintainability, availability, and
supportability (RMA&S) factors. The ILSP is
significantly expanded at this time to cover all
subsequent integrated logistics support elements and
activities throughout the system life-cycle. The ILSP
includes a set of sub-plans which serve as road maps
for achieving program technical and management
requirements (See Figure 2).
The goal of the Full-Scale Development (FSD) phase
is to produce a fully tested, documented, and
production-engineered design of the concept selected
in the Demonstration and Validation phase. Critical
design review is conducted through the use of
simulations incorporating the RMA&S factors previously
determined. In the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding programs,






































Figure 2 . LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLAN ELEMENTS 7
7 Ibid., p. 328.
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through extensive use of surrogate ships, and combat
systems and propulsion plant Land Based Test
Sites (LBTS ' s) . In the case of the FFG-7 Class,
systems planned for use on that ship class were
installed, tested, and evaluated on existing ship
classes. Pilot production is accomplished through
the lead-ship/follow-ship concept where a contract is
let for the production of one ship only. Then, based
on results of testing the lead-ship, design changes
are made as needed prior to letting contracts for full
scale production.
The FSD phase can be characterized as an
iterative process of design-test-redesign, again
taking into account all elements of the ILS process.
The end result is a base-line configuration design
and documentation package which represents a cost
effective, operationally suitable, and producible
system which meets the original mission requirement.
During the Production and Deployment phase, the
development activity proceeds with the planned
procurement and introduction of the system into the
Fleet. Full scale, economic production i s
accomplished with quality assurance controls in place




The elements of ILS are continually reviewed
throughout the production and deployment of the system
in order to determine the degree to which the system
is capable of meeting the original mission
requirements. RMA&S factors are monitored and updated
as the system and its components function in the
operational environment. Where necessary, product
improvements are made to ensure the system operates as
designed throughout its life-cycle.
19
III. WHERE DO WE STAND?
A . INTRODUCTION
Since adopting an ILS policy for the procurement
of ships, the Navy has attempted to achieve ILS
objectives within the its current organizational
framework. Though the Navy cannot state unequivocably
that it has succeeded in achieving those objectives,
it can say that it has made substantial progress.
However, the Navy's progress is concentrated in the
early phases of the acquisition process rather than
the entire life-cycle of ships procured.
The concept under which the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY
(FFG-7) Class Guided Missile Frigate Class was born
was the result of a strategic study launched in 1970
by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo
Zumwalt . ° Out of the study was born the idea that if
the surface Navy was to remain a viable naval force as
military budgets continued to shrink, then the
procurement of expensive and highly capable ships must
be reduced and supplemented by the procurement of a
greater number of lower cost and less capable ships .
This concept became known as the "high-low mix"
strategy and was the impetus for the Patrol Frigate,
8 Frederick B. Easton, "Case Study: FFG-7 Class Ship"
(Masters Thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
CA, June 1978), p. 15.
20
later redesignated the OLIVER HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7)
Class Guided Missile Frigate. The "high-low mix"
concept was deeply rooted in the Navy's two primary
tactical missions, projection and sea control,
To accomplish its projection mission, the Navy
requires expensive and highly capable platforms to
operate in what are considered to be high threat
locations. Of course, the Navy would prefer such
platforms to accomplish any mission, but continually
austere budget constraints will not permit such
luxury. To accomplish its sea control mission, the
Navy is required to keep open vast expanses of ocean
which are not considered to be high threat locations .
Thus, while projection requires highly capable and
expensive ships, sea control requires less expensive
and capable ships, but in much greater numbers to
cover the vast ocean areas. FFG-7' s were to be a
major component of the low end of the high-low mix
strategy. The ship class was to be a small
inexpensive surface combatant capable of providing
open ocean escort support for amphibious, logistical,
and merchant convoys in a low threat environment. The





A chronology of major events in the FFG-7
Class Acquisition Program is provided in Appendix A.
The chronology includes those events considered major
by the FFG-7 Class Program Management Office (PMO)
.
The period covered by the chronology is 1970-1984.
The PMO is currently updating the chronology t o
include the period from 1984 to 1987. However, the
information being compiled is not available to the
author.
2 . LL2. Management Organization
The FFG-7 Class ILSP was developed in 1975.
Its executive summary stated that ILS planning for
maintenance, supply support, and manning of the FFG-7
Class is based on the Projected Operational
Environment, which establishes the most demanding
operational condition for which a ship must be manned ;
i.e., at sea in wartime performing open escort
missions in low threat locations. Under this
condition the ship must be capable of performing
offensive and defensive tasks, simultaneously, in
condition I (General Quart ers /Battle Stations);
performing functions as specified in the Required
Operational Capabilities; maintaining readiness
condition III (wartime cruising) continuously at sea
22
for sixty days; and performing all maintenance for
which ship's company is assigned responsibility. In
meeting these requirements, two principal ILS
objectives guided the development of the ILSP for the
FFG-7 Class:
1. to minimize shipboard manning.
2 . to minimize the off-line time for depot level
maintenance, thereby increasing at-sea
utilization. ,f »
The FFG-7 Class Ship Acquisition Program was
established by Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command
Instruction, NAVSHIPINST 5430.101, dated 24 August
1971 (now cancelled) , and was later established as a
Naval Sea Systems Command Designated Project by
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command Instruction,
NAVSEAINST 5400.49, dated 7 June 1977. The latter
instruction was superseded by NAVSEAINST 5400. 49A,
dated 9 November 1981. This instruction assigned
responsibility for life-cycle logistic management of
the FFG-7 Class to the Ship Acquisition Program
Manager (SHAPM)
.
Such dual responsibility was beneficial, in that it
provided a continuity of effort in introducing the
FFG-7 Class to the Fleet. After this initial
phase, life cycle logistic management of the Class
was transferred to the Gas Turbine Surface
9 U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command (PMS 399), Guided
Missile Frigate Program Plan for Integrated Logistic Support
of the FFG 7 Class . Washington, D. C.,2 October 1975.
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Combatant Ship Logistics Division (NAVSEA 914) on 1
June 1983. . . . 10
Under the Navy's standard Program Management
organization, an ILS Manager was assigned to the
Program Management Office (PMO) . As depicted in
Figure 3, FFG-7 Class ILS management is conducted
within a very complex matrix organizational structure.
The organizational structure is that typically found
in DOD acquisition programs. An interesting point in
this regard is the fact that the ILS effort was to be
conducted within the constraints of the existing Navy
organization and command structure. 11
The hierarchical nature of the Navy's command
and organizational structure brings an exceptional
number of management layers into play when dealing
with the myriad of elements associated with ILS. In
essence, the elements of ILS are "farmed out" to the
many different commands and participating activities
which are tasked with the responsibility of carrying
out particular ILS functions.
1(
^U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command, History of the Oliver
Hazard Perrv Class (FFG-1) Shipbuilding Program 1974-1984 . p.
2-1.



































ILS ORGANIZATION FOR FFG-7 CLASS 12
3 . "Flv-Before-Buv" Concept
In an article published in the March 1978 U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings the FFG-7 Program
12 Ibid., p. 5-53
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Manager (PM) , Captain John D. Beecher, U.S. Navy,
stated:
Logistic support of the ship was a factor kept in
mind at every phase of the design The use of
"fly-before-buy" has permitted us to avoid the many
growing pains normally associated with the lead
ship of a class and provides a level of confidence
in the capabilities and reliability of the follow
ships now under contract.^
The "fly-before-buy" concept is not new to the
Navy's acquisition process. Its use has been
prevalent in the acquisition of DOD aircraft and its
name refers to the practice of testing/ "flying" and
evaluating prototype aircraft in order to determine if
design and performance characteristics meet those
required before making large scale procurement
decisions. Such a concept also reduces costs
associated with design changes made during full scale
production of systems.
The FFG-7 Class was to be the first major ship
class to be procured under this concept. However:
One doesn't "fly" a ship the FFG-7 herself can
almost be regarded as a prototype because of the
two-year gap between her completion and that of the
second ship in the class "Fly-before-buy" is
a misnomer in more ways than the obvious. If you
truly built a ship and tested her completely before
you let a contract for the subsequent ships in the
class, the gap would be so large that the
technology would be behind you. The follow ships
would be obsolete. ... It takes four years for us
13 John D. Beecher, Capt, USN, "FFG-7: The Concept and
Design," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. March 1978, pp.
148-150.
26
to build one of these ships from contract to
delivery, and close to a year to fully test it. 14
The FFG-7 Class Acquisition Program was a
modification of the original Lead/Follow Ship concept .
Under this modification, Land Based Test Sites and
surrogate ships were used to test and evaluate the
combat and engineering systems being installed in the
lead ship. Lessons learned during the testing were
incorporated into the design and production of the
lead ship. In addition, the contracts for the first
increment of follow ships was signed before the lead
ship was launched (See years 1976 & 1977 in Appendix) .
4 . Design-to-Cost Concept
The FFG-7 Class Shipbuilding Program was the
first major shipbuilding program to be undertaken
under the "Design-to-Cost" (DTC) concept. The DTC
concept is simply tailoring the design, development,
and production process of a ship/system so that the
ultimate cost is equal to the money
available (financial ceiling) for building the required
number of systems or units. In a broader context, DTC
must also consider LCC; that is, it must include not
only the costs to acquire a ship/system but also the
costs incurred during the life of the ship/system. 15
14 Ibid.
15 S.E. Stephanou and Michael M. Obradovitch, Pro iect
Management:. Systems Development: and Productivity (Malibu, CA:
Daniel Spencer, 1985) p. 234.
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For the FFG-7 Class, the original DTC ceiling was set
at $50 million per ship (FY73 dollars) . After
preliminary design work was complete, the DTC ceiling
was set at $45.7 (FY73 dollars) million per unit.
However, as early as March 1978, the estimated cost of
follow-on ships had risen to $68 million per ship.
On 18 October 1971, the Chief of Naval
Operations established two other thresholds for the
FFG-7 Class program in an attempt to decrease the LCC
for the follow-on ships of the Class. First, a
maximum of 185 accommodations were to be designed into
the ship. This would limit the future LCC manpower
costs associated with the deployment of the ship.
However, the current Ship's Manning Document (SMD)
,
dated 22 September 1983, provides a total manning for
the ship's force of 202-209 personnel. Those numbers
exclude personnel required to operate helicopters
which would require an additional 20-29 acommodations
depending on the helicopter type. Secondly, the
maximum full-load displacement for the Class was not
to exceed 3400 tons. This would limit the room for
adding additional systems without removal of some
other system, thereby limiting the total number of
systems onboard and the associated life-cycle
maintenance and support costs. This threshold has
also been exceeded. The average full -load
28
displacement of the 1st and 2nd production flight
ships is 3790 tons.
C . OTHER DESIGN PROBLEMS
Throughout the FFG-7's acquisition history, the
PMO wrestled with numerous problems which appear to be
ILS related. 1 ** More importantly, and contrary to the
PM's statement, problems in the design occurred which
should have been prevented by the proper application
of the aforementioned ILS principles during the
acquisition process. Some examples of design problems
which were present in follow-on ships of the class
are
:
1 . In spite of the Navy's extensive experience in
designing and building salt water systems, the
fire mains and the cooling water systems of the
FFG-7 class ships have experienced significant
problems . Ferrous materials and dissimilar
metals were used in the fire main. Butterfly
valves were used in the fire main and salt
water cooling systems; gate valves should have
been installed as a safety measure and to
facilitate preventive maintenance. Heat
exchangers in the auxiliary systems experienced
rapid and destructive erosion from excessive
1 ^A detailed listing of PMO concerns and problems is
contained in "History of the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7)
Class, 1970-1984".
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flow rates caused by the high pressure of the
fire main supply.
Due to the use of bimetallic fittings o n
weather decks, topside corrosion created an
unacceptable maintenance problem for the
minimum manned crew. The fittings were
selected as a maintenance free alternative to
traditional fittings, but resulted in increased
maintenance. This problem was so serious that
it resulted in the promulgation of a FFG-7
Class Corrosion Control Manual in 1983. The
Manual detailed a number of special coatings
and fittings to be installed and refurbished at
specified intervals throughout a ship's life-
cycle . I 7
Even though the Navy has used diesel generators
for years, the ship service diesel
generators (SSDG ' s) selected for the FFG-7 class
are a source of continuing problems and
unreliable operation. This problem resulted in
the formation of a Senior Navy Steering Board
to review the problems associated with the
FFG-7 Class SSDG's. As a result of the Board's
1
'While serving as the Engineer Officer, the author was
unable to get the special coatings and fittings installed on
the 25th ship of the class. The ship's Readiness Support
Group (RSG) was not even aware of the Manual's existence and
stated that no funding was programmed or available to carry
out the requirements as set forth in the Manual.
30
review, consideration is being given to
replacing the FFG-7 Class SSDG with a more
reliable and proven system.
The above problems are only a sampling of the
problems experienced and addressed by the PMO
.
The
author experienced the above problems during his
assignment to the twenty-fifth ship of the class (June
1982-July 1985) . While the problems appear to be due
to a lack of careful monitoring of engineering design,
they should have been discovered, and therefore
prevented, during the development of the ILSP which
includes the Reliability and Maintainability
(Interface) Plan.
Additionally, the PMO was not assigned
responsibility as Life Cycle (Operational Phase)
Manager until 1980, nine years after the start of the
Conceptual/Design phase of the program. The author is
unable to determine where this responsibility was
assigned prior to 1980. It appears that the
responsibility was fragmented among various NAVSEA
elements. This absence of Program Mangagement
attention to ILS considerations during the early
design process might account for the problems (diesel
generator selection, bimetallic corrosion, fire main,
etc.) experienced as the class became operational.
The Program Management Office should have been able to
31
detect those flaws during the initial design phase i f
its personnel had had responsibility for Life Cycle
Management at that time.
D . OBSERVED OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
1 . Experience Base
The author's experience is limited to that of
a commissioning engineer officer assigned to a OLIVER
HAZARD PERRY (FFG-7) Class Guided Missile Frigate.
The FFG-7 ILSP addressed the construction of forty-
nine ships. The lead ship was delivered in 1977. The
author was assigned to the twenty-fifth ship of the
class in the second production block. 18 He reported
to the building yard in Bath, Maine in 1982, five
months prior to the ship's commissioning, and served
as Engineer Officer for three years after
commissioning. This span of time included the ship's
CINCLANTFLT initial Light Off Examination in Bath,
Maine, numerous inspections required for fleet
certification, the ship's first major Sixth Fleet
deployment, and finally, her first CINCLANTFLT
Propulsion Examining Board (PEB) Operational Propulsion
Plant Examination (OPPE) . Previously, the author had
been assigned to the Battle Group Staff which had
l°Splitting the follow ships into blocks was intended to
avoid the high cost-risks associated with multiyear contracts




operational control of the lead ship during its first
deployment in 1980 and which was also assigned as
administrative commander for the follow-on ships




While assigned to the Battle Group Staff
during the lead ship's maiden deployment, the author
became aware of the first failure in the Navy' s
execution of ILS principles for the class. The FFG-7
class was originally designed to fulfill a mission of
convoy escort. To fulfill that mission, it would
operate in conjunction with high technology/expensive
platforms to provide multi-threat protection to
merchant or less capable service force shipping.
During the lead ship's deployment, the author observed
the ship's crew and officers struggle to make the ship
perform in the very different role of serving in a
Battle Group. A simple example was the ship's
difficulty in maintaining a constant signal bridge
watch within the Battle Group with only one rated
signalman. The ILSP had provided manning for the low
level of visual signaling required in convoy escort
operations vice the much higher intensity required for
Battle Group operations.
In the definitions above, an inherent
responsibility exists for training the operational
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commanders in the ILS process in order to provide them
with a better understanding of the factors considered
in designing a ship's manning plan. While the
operational commander was fully aware of the FFG-7's
purpose, he was not aware of the details associated
with her minimum manning or the intricacies of her
design considerations. As a minimum, one would think
that NAVSEA would have given the operational commander
definite guidance, in the form of operational
scenarios, as to how the ship was to be utilized in
order to evaluate and prove her ability to meet
specific design characteristics. By no means is the
author advocating limiting the operational commander's
utilization of a fleet asset. However, the Program
Management Office should have been actively involved
with the operational commander in determining the
operational tasking of the lead ship during her maiden
deployment. This would have alleviated the forcing
of the FFG-7 to perform as an element of the battle
group when it was not designed for that purpose.
3 . Technical Data
The second failure of ILS in the author's
experience became evident as the ship attempted to
establish a technical library. As the ship's delivery
date approached, the ship was innundated with numerous
technical manuals and drawings provided by the
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contractor. An enormous amount of energy was expended
by ship's company in attempting to track down
technical manual shortages. The Ship's Drawing Index
microfiche was delivered by the contractor with no
index and the more than 20,000 microfiche cards in no
particular order. Though the contract provided for
the contractor to provide the material, it did not
specify any condition. Additionally, many of the
technical manuals received onboard were already
outdated or in need of changes due to configuration
changes in equipment. Liaison with the Supervisor of
Shipbuilding and Repair proved fruitless in correcting
these problems
.
Keep in mind that the ship was minimum manned
and that ship's company was involved in intensive
training in actual ship operations during this pre-
fleet certification period. Those cards and technical
manuals contained technical information and diagrams
of the ship's equipment and systems and were not
readily available as a very valuable training tool
during that period. And the manhours required for
ship's force to sort and file 20,000 microfiche cards
were not available. An additional result, as the ship
became operational, was an increase in the time
required to perform certain ship's force maintenance
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actions due to the time required to locate specific
technical data.
4 . Repair Parts Support
Inadequacies in repair parts support also
became apparent as the ship became a fully operational
unit and progressed from funding out of new Ships
Construction (SCN) to Type Commander operational
funding. Parts for several critical systems were
unavailable in the Navy Supply System and required
direct liaison with manufacturers in order to maintain
the ship in a fully operational status. While under
warranty and in the SCN envelope, the ship experienced
little or no problems with parts support. The
building yard and Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
provided direct parts support outside of normal supply
channels. However, once the ship was outside the SCN
envelope, shipboard managers often had to deal
directly with manufacturers to effect timely repairs
to critical equipment.
A case in point concerned fuel filters for the
General Electric LM2500 Gas Turbine Engine, the ship's
main propulsion engines. The filters were listed as
allowed onboard items in the ship's Consolidated
Onboard Ship's Allowance List(COSAL), but were not in
stock (NIS). The requirement for the filters arose out
of the tasking of the ship to proceed underway for a
36
period of approximately 90 days of independent
operations
.
Because no off-ship support would be
available for that period, prudence dictated that
spare filters should be onboard before sailing. After
exhausting all efforts within the ship's chain of
command, short of submitting a CASREPT
(
Casualty
Report) saying that the ship's main engines were less
than fully capable (which wasn't true), ship's force
personnel procured the filters directly from the
manufacturer at a tenth of the cost listed in the
ship's supply manuals. Because the ship's main
engines were in fact fully operational, a CASREPT
would have been limited to a readiness rating which
would not have allowed the assignment of a high
priority to the requisition. If the crew had waited
until the engines had actually been placed out o f
commission by a failed filter, the readiness rating on
a CASREPT would have been such that the highest
priority could have been assigned to the requisition
and appropriate attention from higher authorities
would have been brought to bear on the problem.
Unfortunately, the ship's main engines would not have
been operational while waiting for filters.
Numerous other parts were likewise not
available in the supply system and, in some cases,
were not even listed in the appropriate supply
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manuals. Numerous ACR's (Allowance Change Requests)
were submitted via the chain of the command. However,
due to the time required for the processing of such
paperwork through the various echelons o f
responsibility, submitting ACR's did little to solve
the ship's immediate problem of being fully operation.
The author believes that the reason for such
inadequacies is due, in part, to a serious lack of
knowledge, on the part of operators, concerning the
importance of the feedback systems associated with
ILS. People in the fleet are primarily concerned with
meeting day-to-day commitments. In meeting those
operational commitments, operators often circumvent
normal feedback systems for the sake of expediency.
The process by which one gets a part to effect repairs
to a system is not important. For an operator,
repairing or maintaining his system in a timely manner
is his foremost concern. As a result, many support
requirements and conditions existing in the fleet are
never reported via the feedback systems in place. The
end result is that valuable information concerning the
need for life-cycle support for the ship and its
systems does not reach those individuals/activities
responsible for providing that support. Thus,
education of operators as to the importance of such
feedback information is essential.
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5 • Maintenance Planning
The accomplishment of normal scheduled
preventive maintenance provided further cause for
dismay. The Class Maintenance Plan (CMP) relied
heavily on Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)
.
The ship was scheduled for an intermediate maintenance
availability every six months in which preprogrammed
maintenance or replacement of selected equipments was
to be accomplished. These maintenance periods were
conducted by the Ship's Intermediate Maintenance
Activity (SIMA) in the ship's homeport, or by a
Destroyer Tender when deployed. However, numerous
maintenance actions were deferred due to non-
availability of repair parts.
The lack of repair parts availability during
these predetermined intervals increased the day-to-day
maintenance workload on the minimum manned crew.
Equipments scheduled for maintenance or replacement
during Intermediate Maintenance
Availabilities (IMAV s) , but having such deferred due
to non-availability of Ready For Issue spares,
frequently required increased levels of maintenance by
ship's force personnel in order to meet operational
commitments. At the same time, some equipment
initially required more maintenance than the
Reliability, Maintainability, Availability, and
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Supportability (RMA&S) data originally indicated. ^
This additional maintenance was not included in the
development of the class manning plan and caused
numerous difficulties in day-to-day shipboard
operations due to the limited number of personnel
available to accomplish such tasks. Finally,
maintenance activity personnel lacked the required
training and equipment to accomplish many of the
preprogrammed maintenance actions
.
A combination of the non-availability of Ready
For Issue spares and the non-availability of other
repair parts to perform preprogrammed maintenance
meant that the Class Maintenance Plan and the minimum
manning concept, the two principal ILS objectives of
the ILSP presented on page 23, could not be achieved.
6 . m Summary
While ILS is indeed a logical and systematic
approach to ship acquisition, the Navy's execution of
its principles for the FFG-7 Class fell short o f
achieving its objectives. With the myriad of
activities and organizations contributing to the
overall execution of ILS, it is hard to pinpoint the
reason for such deficiencies in logistic support after
more than 25 ships had been commissioned. However,
^Design reliabilities are not easily attainable. There
is a 50% chance of worse performance, i.e., lower
reliability.
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the author believes that the deficiencies stem from 1 )
a lack of effective communication between shipboard
managers/operators and those individuals/activities
responsible for ship design and providing direct
logistic support and 2) an absence of accountability
among those individuals/activities for carrying out
specific actions required to support fleet units.
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IV. WHERE SHOULD WE GO FROM HERE?
A . SUMMARY
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) is a
disciplined, unified, and iterative approach to the
management and technical activities necessary to: (a)
integrate support considerations into system and
equipment design; (b) develop support requirements
that are related consistently to readiness objectives,
to design, and to each other; (c) acquire the required
support; and (d) provide the required support during
the operational phase at minimum cost. The U. S. Navy
became serious about ILS due to shrinking defense
budgets and the potential cost savings afforded by its
application to the system acquisition process. DOD
guidance requires that ILS be considered throughout
the acquisition process in order to assure cost
consciousness and effective life-cycle support for
fleet systems. It pulls together concept, design,
test and evaluation, production, and operations into
the continuous development of systems to be used by
today's Navy.
The FFG-7 Class Shipbuilding Program provided the
arena for the Navy's first application of ILS
principles to the acquisition of a major class o f
ships. The FFG-7 Class program also provided for the
Navy's first application of the " fly-before-buy" and
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"design-to-cost" concepts to a major shipbuilding
effort . The purpose of implementing the three
concepts was to minimize the LCC associated with
acquiring, maintaining, and supporting the ship class
.
Experience and research point to several problems
in the FFG-7 Class Shipbuilding Program which raise
questions regarding the effectiveness of the Navy ' s
application of ILS principles to that ship class.
Those problems in the areas of design, evaluation,
production, and operations could have been effectively
dealt with within the framework of a properly executed
ILSP.
B . CONCLUSIONS
1 FFG-7 Class Acquisition Program
The FFG-7 Class Shipbuilding Program is the
Navy's first major shipbuilding program in which ILS
was attempted. While the ILS effort was directed by a
myriad of 00D, SECNAV, and OPNAV instructions, its
execution has left much to be desired. However, there
are lessons to be learned from the procurement of the
FFG-7 Class ship. These ships were to be small
inexpensive surface combatants capable of providing
open ocean escort support for amphibious, logistical,
and merchant convoys in a low threat environment.
Instead, the Navy has procured a class of not so
inexpensive and highly capable ships. Examples of
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increased capabilities include the addition of the 2
helicopter hangars, the missile launcher, the towed
array system, and the fin stabilizers.
Unfortunately, the ILS process for the Class
proceeded under the original cost and design
constraints. The FFG-7 Class ILSP should be updated
to reflect the logistics support required for the ship
class as it is being utilized in the fleet today.
Life-cycle logistics support requirements for high
tempo/high threat battle group operations are quite
different from the requirements for low tempo/low
threat convoy escort operations.
The FFG-7 PMO should review the life-cycle
Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) for the ship
class, develop a plan for life-cycle Pre-Programmed
Product Improvement (P^I) , and continually monitor and
update both the ROC and the P^I plan. This would
require planning in excess of the current Five Year
Defense Plan (FYDP)
.
The design-to-cost concept appears to also
have fallen short of its objectives. The follow ships
unit cost goal was exceeded by more than 36%($18.3M
over the $49. 7M goal). And ironically, the effect of
the accommodations and displacement constraints
imposed by the CNO was the opposite of that intended.
While the constraints were an effort to limit costs,
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the emphasis on Design-to-Cost lead to artificial
design constraints which were not workable and which
now require costly fixes later in the FFG-7 Class
life-cycle.
Additionally, if the Navy had built a
prototype ship and tested her completely before
letting contracts for subsequent ships in the class,
other design problems could have been solved. For
example, the costly reliability problems associated
with the FFG-7 Class ship's service generators would
have been discovered during prototype testing.
Thorough testing and evaluation of the generators
would have eliminated nine years of excessive and
costly maintenance as well as consideration of a plan
to replace the 216 generators on the 54 ships already
in service.
2 . General Conclusions
The acquisition of a large class of ships is a
complex and costly undertaking. To bring the myriad
of elements which comprise the ILS effort to bear on
the process of acquiring ships/systems in the most
efficient manner possible, requires an acquisition
environment which supports the intensive effort
required to achieve ILS objectives. As the U.S. Navy
attempts to meet mission requirements within the
financial constraints imposed by changing
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Administrations and Congress, it must acquire its
systems in the most efficient manner possible.
Inclusion of Integrated Logistics Support is the
process which makes such efficiency possible. When
the principles of ILS are properly applied, the
magnitude of the LCC savings achieved will become
obvious, even if not entirely measureable
.
The Navy's ability to accurately predict long
range LCC appears to be in its infancy. In support of
design-to-cost objectives, the Navy must develop the
quantitative techniques necessary to reduce the
magnitude of the uncertainty associated with LCC
estimates. Without improvement in this area, it will
be very difficult to convince Congress to pass
legislation allowing DOD to procure ships on a multi-
year, life-cycle support basis. In any case, the
commitment of financial resources for the life of a
ship/system is essential to the achievement of ILS
objectives
.
Operational and administrative commanders must
understand that the operational employment of ships is
a major consideration in the design and execution of
ILS principles and should maintain active and
effective communication with the Program Management
Office throughout a ship's life-cycle. Officers at
every level of the chain of command should be educated
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in ILS principles and the importance of those
principles in meeting readiness and logistics support
objectives. The Navy should also implement
communications channels which promote the timely,
free, and effective exchange of valuable logistics
support information both up and down the chain o f
command.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
The author recommends the following actions with
regard to the execution of ILS principles in future
Navy shipbuilding programs. The recommendations are
also applicable to the FFG-7 Class Shipbuilding
Program.
1 . It is recommended that DOD move toward a
strategic planning process which coincides
with the life-cycles of the ships/systems it
procures. The current Five Year Defense Plan
(FYDP) appears inadequate. For the FFG-7
Class, that would mean developing a plan
spanning 20-25 years. Pre-Programmed Product
Improvement (P^i) covering this period could
alleviate fluctuation in program objectives
and give the Program Management Office time to
fully test a ship system in its operational
environment before committing enormous
financial resources to its full procurement.
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While ILS Managers are currently assigned the
responsibility for the life-cycle support of
acquired systems, it is recommended that they
also be given the authority to implement that
support . Such direct control should include
the responsibility and authority to obligate
the budget, to procure and distribute repair
parts unique to the particular ship/system,
and to provide configuration management of the
ship class. Such authority should also
include direct control over all the
people/activities performing such tasks.
The Program Management Office must continually
review design changes and the operational
employment of procured units and ensure that
the ILSP is updated to reflect support
requirements for particular design and
employment scenarios. The FFG-7 Class
requires immediate attention in this area.
It is recommended that the Navy establish a
program to train operators/managers in the
principles of ILS and their impact on the
achievement of ILS objectives. Such training
must extol the virtues of life-cycle support
and teach shipboard managers (l)how ILS
impacts on their ability to use the
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ship/system in accomplishing its mission and
(2) what they can do to improve the life cycle
support for their systems. If the Navy
intends to reap the benefits of effective ILS
efforts, it must bring the people who manage
its ships/systems during the operational life-
cycle into the overall process. Every
ma n a g e r / 1 e a de r who exercises any
administrative or operational control over a
ship/system should be aware of the decisions
which guided its development and ILS strategy.
Additionally, these same operators must have a
direct, open, and responsive line of
communication to and from the ILS management
team throughout the life of the ship/system.
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APPENDIX
FFG-7 CLASS ACQUISITION CHRONOLOGY
1970
9 September OPNAV initiated feasibility study.
31 December Program Budget Decision (PBD) 507 was
released, indicating "Navy should
expedite action on the new design
escort ship.
.
.to be built in quantity
for a unit cost of about $50
million..." NAVSHIPS released report
on the status of the PF feasibility
studies confirming "the general
feasibility of an ASW Patrol Escort in
the $40-$50 million range for follow
ships." Conclusions regarding probable
costs for the more costly AAW
configuration were not provided.
1971
12 January The CNO approved proceeding into PF
Con-ceptual Phase.
13 March SHAPM presented interim report to the
CNO indication feasibility of FY73
award for lead ship.
6 May The CNO selected PF payload
characteristics and generally approved
PF lead ship-follow ship procurement
concept in lieu of a more time-
consuming and costly PF prototype. A
limiting full-load displacement of 3000
tons was provisionally imposed.
14 May COMNAVSHIPS advised OPNAV by memo that
the 3000 ton limit was unrealistic,
suggesting 3500 tons as a practical
limit. Further, he suggested limiting
cost rather than displacement as a more
appropriate control.
20 May The CNO selected single shaft
propulsion alternative and established
$45 million as upper limit of follow
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ship cost in FY73 dollars and an upper
limit of full-load displacement of 3400
tons. Predicted full load displacement
at that time was 3765 tons, with the
following characteristics in comparison
with today's characteristics:
1 helo vice 2 helos
Cruise engine vice no cruise engine
SQQ-23 (pair) sonar vice SQS-56
35mm vice 7 6mm OTO MELARA gun
TACTAS space and weight
1 June NAVSEC commenced preliminary design.
12 July PF Advance Procurement Plan (APP) was
submitted to NAVMAT, based on assumed
receipt of $51.6 million FY72 funds.
3 July President Nixon submitted to Congress
amendments to the request for DOD
appropriations, including PF request
for $51. 6M.
1 August PMS399 was asigned ship acquisition
responsibility for PFs
.
August Senate Armed Services Committee
rejected request to amend the budget to
provide $51. 6M for PF.
15 September The CNO approved 2-block approach and
associated late ship deliveries
resulting from cutback of FY72 funds.
8 October APP was re-submitted to NAVMAT to
reflect changes due to FY72 cutbacks.
18 October CNO established thresholds for
accommodations (185; a reduction of 30
through reduced maintenance work load)
,
full load displacement (3400 tons) , and
redefined the $45M cost ceiling for
follow ships to exclude shipbuilder
escalation
.
5 November Original APP was approved.
08 November Industry Briefing was held for
potential PF shipbuilders.
51
15 December Request for proposals for Ship System
Design Support (SSDS) was released.
2 1 December COMNAVORD and COMNAVSHIPS, in a joint
letter, advised CNO of necessity for
second UYK 7 computer.
1972
18 February SSDS proposals were received.
2 5 February CHNAVMAT was briefed by SHAPM on
computer problem noted above due t o
inaction on part of CNO. CHNAVMAT sent
memo to CNO personally reaffirming need
for second computer.
12 April SSDS contracts were awarded.
2 6 April CNO Executive Board (CEB) was briefed
on computers by OP-03D and SHAPM.
1 May CNO memo for the record approved second
UYK 7 computer with 16,000 word memory
limitation. CNO also directed
feasibility study be made ASAP for dual
helo hangars in PF . Weight and space
for Close-in-weapons-system were also
added as characteristic requirement.
2 May The CNO modified PF characteristics: 2
vice 1 helo, 76mm vice 35mm gun, SQS-
505 type vice SQQ-23 sonar, and imposed
a $300K limit on the Electronic
Warfare (EW) suite. Weight and space
for helo hauldown system added.
5 June NAVSHIPS documented revised average
cost estimate of follow ships to
$45. 7M. NAVSHIPS also recommended that
Future Characteristics Change (FCC)
reserves be established and that
mechanical stabilizer be incorporated
in the design.
27 June OPNAV directed weight and space
reservation for an unspecified
electronic device with antenna to be
located above pilothouse. Attempts to
obtain engineering details from OPNAV
were fruitless.
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9 August Revised APP was approved.
17 August OP-03D approved dual helo hangar
arrangement
.
2 4 August OPNAV concurred in the revised cost of
$45. 7M. FCC reserves were disapproved.
Space only for stabilizers was
authorized.
27 September SECDEF authorization was granted to
proceed with development and
construction of the lead ship, land-
based test sites, and advance
procurement funding.
2 4 October CNO issued approved characteristics for
PF. ("Plan for Use" and other Top
Level Requirement (TLR) items were not
included.
)
11 December Preliminary Allocated Baseline (PABL)
was completed and circulated within the




5 February Fleet input to CIC design requested
addition of an Operational Summary
Console
.
2 February OPNAV requested redesign of the ship
control console so as to provide the
capability for either the helmsman or
the OOD to man ship controls on a share
basis. This required major redesign of
console due to change in concept and
dual control requirement.
2 6 February PABL Review was completed.
13 April PABL comments were adjudicated.
19 April Lead Ship Allocated Baseline (LSABL)
was completed.
1 May Bath Iron Works (BIW) SSDS contract was
modified to include startup of Detail
Design, with exception of bridge.
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17 May RFP for the Detail









Due to a lack of OPNAV action on TLR
submitted 24 Oct 72, SHAPM extracted
the "Plan For Use" section and
submitted it to OPNAV for approval in
view of implications for the Navy ' s
maintenance planning for PF ' s . OP-097
then requested the TLR be revised to in
accordance with latest CNO-CHNAVMAT
agreements on format and the "Plan for
Use" be incorporated therein rather
than issued as separate document.
Although repeated attempts had been
made with OP-097 staff to expedite the
TLR, it had never been issued. Hence,
the "Plan for Use" as submitted was
used by NAVMAT in maintenance planning.
BIW proposal for Detail Design and Con-
struction was received.
July Test and Evaluation (T&E) coordinated
meetings commenced among OP-097, OP-98,
COMOPTEVFOR, SYSCOMS and SHAPM.
2 1 September
2 9 October
NAVSHIPS documented revised average
cost estimate of follow ships to
$47. 7M, reflecting lead ship
negotiations
.
SECNAV approved award of the Lead Ship
Contract to BIW.
3 October Lead Ship Contract for Detail Design
and Construction was awarded to BIW.
3 1 October
1 8 December
BIW SSDS contract work was completed.
Final draft of TEMP (Test & Evaluation





02 January The FY74 Defense Appropriations Act
excluded advance procurement funding of
guided missile launcher components
requested in FY74 in support of the
FY75 program year, resulting in a
predicted four month delay in follow
ship deliveries.
January It was determined that the FFG-7 would
require an additional ship's service
diesel generator (SSDG) set because of
increasing electrical load.
2 5 March TEMP approval was received.
March Fourth SSDG was added to FFG-7 contract
baseline and delivery date was extended
to June 1977.
17 December Fabrication of FFG-7 (the lead ship)
was started.
1975
3 February Initial "Top Level Requirements" were
issued.
April Testing of FFG-7 propulsion plant at
Propulsion System LBTS was started.
12 June Keel of FFG-7 was laid.
September Design and integration of Combat System
was accepted by Navy after successful
development and operational testing at
the Combat System Test Center.
1976
2 January Loading of main machinery of FFG-7 was
started.
February Contracts for first increment of follow
ships were signed with BIW; Todd, Los
Angeles; and Todd, Seattle.
2 5 September FFG-7 was launched.
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September Contract delivery date for FFG-7 was
extended from June 1977 to 31 December
1977 to accommodate a rearrangement of
the Combat Information Center.
12 December Fabrication of FFG-8 was started.
1977
February Contracts were awarded for FY77 ships.
2 April Testing of the Combat System computer
program was started.
2 9 April Keel of FFG-10 was laid at Todd,
Seattle
.
13 July Keel of FFG-9 was laid at Todd, Los
Angeles
18 October FFG-7 builder's trials were started.
16 November FFG-7 Acceptance Trials were completed.
3 November FFG-7 was delivered to Navy one month
ahead of contract delivery date.
1978
January Contracts for FY78 ships were awarded.
1 August "Plan for Use," OPNAVINST C9000.4, was
issued.
2 6 October Post-Shakedown Availability for FFG-7
was started at BIW.
1979
April FY79 ship construction contracts were
awarded.
1 9 November PMS399 promulgated the "Class
Maintenance Plan."
1980
March Completed ship design for FY79 ships
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01 October Responsibility as Life Cycle
(Operational Phase) Manager for FFG-7
Class was assigned to PMS399.
November FY79 Combat System integration design
specifications were completed.
December PMS399 conducted first FFG-7 Class
Program Review for OP-03.
December PMS399 conducted first Deficiency




February FY79 Combat System performance
specifications were completed.
March Started FY79 Combat System integration
testing at Combat System Testing
Center
.
April FY79 working drawings were validated.
15-16 October FFG-7 Ship Class Program Review was
conducted by DCNO (Surface Warfare) in
Washington, DC.
1982
January PMS399 conducted Acquisition Appraisal
for Assistant SECNAV.
05 February Technical/Operational Evaluation of
LAMPS III weapon system in the USS
Mclnerney (FFG-8 ) was successfully
completed.
April OPNAV approved a Revised TLR for the
FY79 Baseline.
4 June A firm, fixed-price, letter contract
for full production of fin stabilizer
systems was awarded to Brown Brothers
and Company, Ltd.
2 5 June Eleven weeks of operational test and
evaluation of the FY79 Combat System
were successfully completed at the
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Combat System Land Based Test Center.
No major design problems appeared.
October A prototype fin stabilizer system was
installed in the USS Gallery (FFG-26)
during its Post-Shakedown Availability.
Initial at-sea tests were satisfactory.
1983
14 January FFG-36, the first FY79 Baseline ship,
was delivered to Navy.
1 June "FFG-7 Class Life-Cycle Configuration
Management Plan" was issued. SEA 914
was assigned responsibility as Life-
Cycle (Operational Phase) Manager of
the FFG-7 Class ships.
2 8 November First class of Gas Turbine Technician
students began FFG-7 Class propulsion
system operating training on the "Hot
Plant" at the Great Lakes Naval
Training Center.
1984
2 8 February The USS Underwood (FFG-36) completed
her Post Shakedown Availability at BIW,
during which she became the first U.S.
Navy ship to be equipped with the
production version of the LAMPS MK III
and the Fin Stabilizer System.
17 May The Navy Tactical Interoperability
Support Activity granted U.S. Navy
Interoperability Certification to the
FF-7 Class FY79 Combat System Baseline
LINK 11 Program.
2 8 November The contract for construction of the
single FY84 FFG-61 was awarded to Todd,
Los Angeles. However, performance of
the contract was constrained by a
shortage of funds. Congress originally
directed that this ship include an
upgraded MK 92 Fire Control System and
an X-band phased array radar.
Subsequently, at the request of the
Navy, Congress approved construction of
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the ship with an upgraded MK 92 and a
coherent receiver transmitter.
2 9 November The follow-on contract for Fin
Stabilizer Systems was awarded. This
contract included the procurement of








































Five Year Defense Plan
Integrated Logistics Support
Integrated Logistics Support Plan
Intermediate Maintenance Availability
Land Based Test Site
Life Cycle Costs
Logistics Support Analysis
Logistics Support Analysis Plan
Naval Electronics Systems Command
Naval Ordnance Command
Naval Sea Systems Command
Naval Security Command




OPPE Operational Propulsion Plant Examination
PEB Propulsion Examining Board
PM Program Manager
PMO Program Management Office
RCM Reliability Centered Maintenance
ROC Required Operational Capabilities
RMA&S Reliability, Maintainability, Availabil-
ity, & Supportability
SCN Ships Construction, Navy
SECNAVINST Secretary of the Navy Instruction
SHAPM Ships Acquisition Program Manager
SMD Ship's Manning Document
SPCC Ships Parts Control Center
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